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The Role of International Criminal Law in Environmental Protection
They draw too heavily, too quickly, on already overdrawn environmental resource  accounts  to  be
affordable far into the future without bankrupting those  accounts.  They  may  show  profit  on  the
balance sheets of our generation, but our children will inherit the losses. We borrow environmental
capital from future generations with no intention or prospect of repaying. They  may  damn  us  for
our spendthrift ways, but they can never collect on our debt to them. We act as we  do  because  we
can get away with it: future generations do not vote; they have no political or financial power; they
cannot challenge our decisions.[i]
Introduction
Industrialisation of the world has  transformed  the  traditional  understanding  of  the  relationship
between human beings and nature. The conventional worship, or at least, respect  for  the  sanctity
of the Earth[ii] has been replaced by  a  notion  that  nature’s  sole  function  is  to  provide  human
beings with  unlimited  resources  for  survival  and  economic  expansion.  Every  modern  global
economic system is based on the concept of growth without allowing for the  simple  fact  that  the
riches of the planet are limited.[iii] Thus every industrialised  state  has  an  inexhaustible  demand
for natural resources which causes unsustainable pollution  of  air,  water  and  soil;  deforestation,
desertification,[iv] land degradation, depletion of non-renewable resources, loss of biodiversity  as
well as long-term damage to ecosystems. It will  not  be  terrorism,  religious  wars  or  a  financial
crisis that will be the  major  concern  of  humanity  in  the  21st  century  but  finding  ways  for  a
sustainable cohabitation with the ecosystem.
In the late 1960s and early 1970s states began to acknowledge the urgency of the problem[v] but it
was soon realised that at the rate of today’s destruction we have long passed  the  stage  where  the
environment  was  only  a  national  problem.[vi]  Problems  such  as  air  and  water  pollution   or
desertification do not stop at state borders and but often affect a whole  region.  Many  of  Africa’s
most  serious  environmental  problems  have  an  international  angle;   as   McLaughlin   puts   it,
‘internalisation  of  environmental  destruction’.[vii]  At  the   end   of   the   first   decade   of   the
21st century one can find a plethora of legal instruments on environmental protection. However, as
will be shown, neither national  nor  international  environmental  law  offers  effective  protection
against the very worst acts of environmental destruction in Africa. Gross corporate  environmental
violations in particular appear largely unsanctioned.
This chapter argues that although it is  acknowledged  that  national,  international  regulatory  and
self-regulation instruments are to some extent effective in protecting the environment,[viii] for the
most extreme violations of environmental law, criminal condemnation and punishment is  needed.
Thus international criminal  law  should  be  extended  to  cover  serious  environmental  offences,
especially when committed by corporations. It will  be  proposed  that  the  International  Criminal
Court should extend its jurisdiction to legal persons and introduce the new  international  crime  of
‘grave  crimes  against  the  environment’.  The  remainder  of  this  chapter  will  analyse  existing
national and international legal responses to gross environmental damage and show  the  necessity
and feasibility of the proposed new crime.
2. Peacetime Environmental Damage and International Environmental Law[ix]
The protection of the environment as a  main  focus  appeared  relatively  late  in  international
law. Once the  problem  had  gained  international  attention  however,  an  ever-growing  body  of
international environmental treaties and conventions emerged.[x] In the first half of the  century  a
number of international instruments were adopted dealing with protection of the  wildlife  such  as
fur seals,[xi] whales,[xii] fish,[xiii] polar bears,[xiv] and birds.[xv] Other conventions  were  more
general, such as the Convention Relative to the Preservation of Fauna and  Flora  in  their  Natural
State in Africa[xvi] and the Convention on International  Trade  in  Endangered  Species  of  Wild
Fauna  and  Flora.[xvii]  Instruments  concerned  with  pollution  include  the  1954   International
Convention  for  the  Prevention  of  Pollution  of  the  Sea  by  Oil,[xviii]  the  1973  International
Convention for Prevention of Pollution from Ships,[xix] the 1979  Geneva  Convention  on  Long-
Range Transboundary Air Pollution[xx].
A major stepping stone in rectifying this problem was the Stockholm Conference  in  1972,  which
aimed to find a global approach to environmental  problems.  The  two  major  outcomes  was  the
establishment  of  the  United  Nations  Environment  Program  (UNEP)[xxi]  and  the  Stockholm
Declaration   on   the   Human   Environment   (Stockholm   Declaration).[xxii]   The    Stockholm
Declaration set out 26 non-binding principles of environmental protection including issues such as
sustainability,  conservation  of  wildlife  and  habitat,  toxic  substances,  pollution   of   the   seas,
population growth, nuclear weapons and the ecological balance of the biosphere.  Important  areas
that were not covered include carbon  dioxide  production,  global  warming,  biological  diversity,
chemical and biological weapons and ozone depletion.[xxiii] The latter was  encompassed  by  the
Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer. This and its progeny amount to perhaps
the most substantial achievement of all.[xxiv]
In spite of the growing body of international environmental law, the existing methods for  creating
international  environmental  law  are  still  “slow,  cumbersome,  expensive,   uncoordinated   and
uncertain”.[xxv]  Different   agencies   such   as   the   World   Meteorological   Organization,   the
International Maritime Organization, the World Health  Organisation,  the  Food  and  Agriculture
Organization,  the  United  Nations  Development  Programme  as  well  as   the   United   Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization deal with questions  regarding  the  environment
at the United Nations level. Although the general assembly created UNEP in  order  to  coordinate
this work, it is has to be noted that “[n]early twenty years after the Stockholm Declaration, we still
lack the institutional and legal mechanisms to deal effectively with transboundary  and  biospheric
environmental degradation.”[xxvi] Most importantly, each treaty has to  be  agreed  upon  in  long
negotiation   procedures   without   any   consistent   standard   of   enforcement,    monitoring    or
interpretation of standards. Palmer observes: “…every time a new instrument is  negotiated,  fresh
machinery has to be devised”, which means “the grave risk that on each occasion the  wheel  must
be reinvented.” [xxvii] Still,  the  continuous  expansion  of  international  environmental  law  has
raised  global  awareness  that  the  unrestrained   use   of   nature   is   no   longer   tenable.[xxviii]
Unfortunately, this growing interest in the environment “has paralleled an  ever  accelerating  pace
of destruction of the planet’s ecosystem”[xxix]. The fear  that  environmentally  sound  production
techniques are too expensive for the poorest countries and  thus  any  binding  rules  would  hinder
economic development,  preventing  international  environmental  law  from  developing  a  strong
enforcement regime.
In  sum,  the  methods  and  techniques  now  available  to   fashion   new   instruments   of
international law to cope with global environmental problems cannot meet  that  challenge.
The emerging issues are so big and so all-embracing that current ways of doing things will
not solve these problems.[xxx]
Moreover the proliferation of international  instruments,  impressive  as  it  is,  suffers  from  a
scarcity of ratifications and enforcement at national levels.[xxxi] Levy et al even claim  that  there
is not much indication that environmental rules are enforced  by  international  organisations  who
engage  in  only  symbolic  responses.[xxxii]  Without  denying  its  important  role,   international
environmental law at the moment is unable to prevent the most serious environmental crimes.
Wartime Environmental Damage and International Environmental Law
1 Environmental Damage  in Wartime
When discussing the effectiveness  of  international  environmental  law  in  Africa  it  is  often
overlooked how much environmental harm  is  caused  in  the  context  of  armed  conflict  for  the
following reasons:
i) the environment might be targeted directly as part of the war strategy,
ii) environmental damage is a side-effect of armed violence and
iii) the plundering of natural resources is used to finance the conflict.
As part of battlefield strategy the environment has been  targeted  throughout  history  in  order  to
deprive the enemy of food, water and cover. A modern example is the use  of  chemical  defoliants
in Vietnam and throughout history one can find cases of scorched  earth  practice.  Attacks  on  the
environment  can  also  be  used  as  a  tactic  against  the  civilian  population  (especially  if  it  is
indigenous) by cutting the people off from water, food, shelter and fuel supplies. Additionally, the
plundering of resources might also be employed as a form of reprisal.[xxxiii]
Secondly, environmental destruction is often an inevitable result of war.[xxxiv]  Such  unintended
consequences of armed conflict include environmental harm following  the  use  of  indiscriminate
weapons  and  tactics  such  as  attacks   on   civilian   chemical   and   petroleum   facilities.[xxxv]
Furthermore,    movement    of    troops,    especially    heavy    vehicles    and    the    digging    of
trenches[xxxvi]  often  damage  the  natural  environment,   particularly   when   the   soldiers   are
poaching for food or constructing field camps.[xxxvii] Another problem is the  impacts  of  forced
movement of populations. Refugees and displaced persons have an  impact  on  natural  resources,
which are needed to provide extra  shelter,  food,  cooking  fuel  and  water.  Bruch  warns  that  in
addition “internal armed conflicts often produce  armed  and  lawless  societies  that  can  severely
impact the environment.”[xxxviii]
The third group of environmental damage in the context of armed conflict is mainly found in  civil
war situations where at least one of the parties needs to look for  extra  ways  to  generate  revenue
for feeding and arming their  combatants.  For  example,  significant  environmental  damage  was
caused  during  many  of  the  civil  wars  financed  with  proceeds  from   diamond   mining.   The
consequences of relying on mining to finance civil conflicts are aptly captured in this extract;
For the last two decades diamond mining activities have  focused  on  quick  revenues  to
fuel the civil war. This has resulted in the use of outdated and environmentally damaging
mining procedures and equipment.
Pipe mining is a type of open-pit mining that removes  large  quantities  of  "overburden"
(rocks and dirt) in order to access the  diamonds.  Large  areas  of  land  and  surrounding
ecosystems  are  disturbed  and  damaged.  Generally,  the  overburden  is   not   properly
disposed of, which causes further damage. In  addition,  acid  mine  drainage  can  occur.
Not surprisingly, in Angola, Congo and Sierra Leone, there is  virtually  no  oversight  of
mining operations. In  these  regions,  in  addition  to  the  human  costs  associated  with
“conflict diamonds,” the environmental toll of diamond mining operations can be steep –
pits are left open and loose fill is left unmanaged to run off into rivers and streams,  often
with catastrophic effects.
An additional result of diamond mining is the diversion of rivers to allow for the  mining
of alluvial diamond deposits. When the mine is depleted, the rivers are not  redirected  to
their original courses, which in turn results in the pollution of waters  and  destruction  of
surrounding flora and fauna. The mining activities also degrade the surrounding  land  by
increasing  atmospheric  air  pollution,  contaminating  surface  and   ground   water   and
increasing soil erosion and leaching. The pollution is, in the most extreme cases,  leading
to  desertification  and  permanently  changing  land   use   from   agriculture   to   waste,
rendering it useless to traditional inhabitants when the diamonds have all been mined.  In
the short run the inhabitants of the region are suffering from sickness and disease  related
to  contaminated  drinking  water  supplies.  Such  diseases  include  dysentery,   malaria,
schistosamiases and Biomphalaria pfeiffer.[xxxix]
The trade with multinational corporations in diamonds  allowed  the  rebels  to  purchase  weapons
light enough for children as young as 8 to carry them.[xl] The revenue generated  from  the  illegal
diamond trade is also used to fund the drugs, which are needed to make children  more  aggressive
and able to commit these atrocities as well  as  using  their  addiction  to  control  them.[xli],  [xlii]
Other examples of conflict commodities are oil in Sudan, gold and coltan[xliii] in the  Democratic
Republic of Congo.[xliv] In addition,  wildlife  is  endangered  by  soldiers  hunting  for  food  and
poaching  for  husk,  killing  elephants,  rhinos  and  buffalos.[xlv]  Furthermore,  if  one  side  has
identified an available natural source, this then invites attacks on  those  resources  from  opposing
forces, further damaging the environment.[xlvi]
Multinational corporations are involved  in  these  crimes  when  they  take  advantage  of  a  close
relationship with an oppressive government or regime to exploit natural resources  in  the  conflict
zones[xlvii] and trade in conflict commodities.[xlviii] A corporation might  facilitate  the  ongoing
violence by supplying the oppressors with  the  revenue  needed  to  fund  the  armed  conflict  and
access   global   arms   markets.[xlix]   For   example,   the   Glasgow-based   Weir   group   which
manufactures  oil  pumps  was  accused  of   having   a   close   relationship   with   the   Khartoum
government, which it supported by financing its  conflicts  in  Sudan.[l]  Regrettably  it  has  to  be
recognised that the “influence of some multinational corporations on war situations and on  parties
to conflict is growing steadily”[li] and that they increasingly motivate and fuel the conflict.[lii]
2 International Environmental Law in Wartime
The long-term effects of environmental  damage  caused  as  part  of  belligerent  operations  “may
have  serious   consequences   for   human   health,   economic   stability,   and   future   ecosystem
balance.”[liii] Compared to international  environmental  law  in  peacetime,  the  development  of
international law regarding environmental protection during wartime  is  still  lagging  behind.[liv]
Nevertheless there are a number of relevant  legal  instruments  that  are  applicable  under  certain
circumstances. These are discussed in the next section.
Hague Conventions
The 1907 Hague Conventions codify international law  of  armed  conflict  and  set  out  the  main
principles    which    govern    international    humanitarian    law    -    necessity,    proportionality,
discrimination, and  humanity  -  .[lv]  Not  surprisingly  these  old  instruments  do  not  explicitly
mention environmental protection, however,  some  provisions  can  be  applied  to  environmental
issues. According  to  Article  55  of  Hague  Convention  II,[lvi]  the  occupying  power  may  not
permanently alter or destroy enemy territory  and  irresponsibly  use  the  natural  resources  found
therein. Furthermore, parts of the environment and natural resources can be interpreted as property
of the enemy and therefore fall under  the  protection  of  Article  23(g)  of  Hague  Convention  II,
which prohibits the destruction and seizure of enemy property. However, it is unclear the extent to
which the term ‘property’ encompasses such natural assets as water, air, forests, and wild animals,
which are not under specific ownership.[lvii] Moreover, even allowing for a wide interpretation of
the term property, any environmental  protection  by  The  Hague  Conventions  is  limited  by  the
defence of military necessity.[lviii] The parameters of this principle are very vague and  extremely
difficult to define. DuBarry Huston argues that “[s]ituations are rare, if ever, where necessity does
not excuse  this  conduct.”[lix]  Yet,  there  are  examples  where  aggressors  intentionally  caused
devastating  damage  to  the  environment  without  being  able  to  show  any  significant  military
advantage. For example, the torching of the oil wells in Kuwait and the release of oil into the Gulf
did not give  Iraq  any  noteworthy  military  advantage,  while  at  the  same  time  causing  major
environmental damage.[lx]
Violators of the Hague Conventions are liable to pay compensation under article 3 of 1907  Hague
Convention  Number  IV,  but  the  Conventions  do  not  provide  any  enforcement  mechanisms,
neither  do  they  proscribe  any  criminal  responsibility.  Thus,   the   limited   protection   of   the
environment in the Hague Conventions is of very little effectiveness.
Geneva Conventions
Like the Hague conventions, the Fourth Geneva  Convention  of  1949[lxi]  also  provides  for  the
protection of  property.[lxii]  For  example,  article  33  outlaws  pillaging,  article  53  Geneva  IV
prohibits the destruction by the occupying power of property belonging  to  the  State  or  to  other
public authorities and article 51 outlaws extensive destruction and appropriation of property.[lxiii]
Article  3  of  the  Four  Geneva  Conventions  (Common   article   3),   which   is   the   basis   for
humanitarian protection in non-international armed conflicts, lacks any mention of  environmental
damage,  however,  the  term  “violence  to  life  and  person”  in  article   3(1)(a)   offers   indirect
protection as it prohibits the use of poisonous gas or scorched earth practice.[lxiv]
Article 147 of Geneva IV describes the "extensive destruction and appropriation  of  property,  not
justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly" as a “grave breach” of the
Convention. Grave breaches of  the  Convention  trigger  civil  as  well  as  criminal  liability.[lxv]
Therefore, unlike the Hague  Conventions,  the  Geneva  Conventions  offer  a  route  to  prosecute
individuals for serious damage to the environment. However, as  in  the  Hague  Conventions,  the
four Geneva Conventions provide the defence of military necessity for destructive conduct.[lxvi]
Additional Protocols and ENMOD
The environmental damage  caused  during  the  Vietnam  War  when  the  United  States  military
used  defoliant  herbicides[lxvii],   incendiary   weapons,   removal   of   topsoil   and   rainmaking
techniques,[lxviii]  triggered  a  widespread   international   objection,   which   resulted   in   three
conventions: Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions,[lxix] which  governs  international
armed conflicts (Additional Protocol I), Additional Protocol II  to  the  Geneva  Conventions,[lxx]
which governs non-international conflicts  (Additional  Protocol  II)  and  the  Convention  on  the
Prohibition of Military or  Any  Other  Hostile  Use  of  Environmental  Modification  Techniques
(ENMOD).[lxxi]
Additional Protocol I offers a more  direct  protection  to  that  of  The  Hague  Convention  or  the
Geneva Conventions as it specifically mentions the  environment  as  a  subject  of  its  protection.
Articles 35(3)[lxxii] and 55(1)[lxxiii]of Protocol I explicitly outlaws “widespread,  long-term  and
severe damage to the natural environment”. According to the International Committee of  the  Red
Cross  Commentary  on  Protocol  I,  the  term  ‘environment’  should  be   defined   broader   than
"property" under the 1907 Hague Convention IV or Geneva  Convention  IV  and  “understood  in
the widest sense to  cover  the  biological  environment  in  which  a  population  is  living.”[lxxiv]
Furthermore, the defence of military necessity is restricted in Additional Protocol I. Articles 35(3)
and 55 outlaw severe damage to the environment even when the military objective  outweighs  the
damage to the environment. Moreover, both articles introduce the objective standard of reasonable
foreseeability.[lxxv] This means that it is sufficient to prove the possibility of foresight rather than
direct  intention.   Unfortunately,   each   term   is   quite   vague   and   allows   a   very   restricted
interpretation.[lxxvi] The effectiveness of Additional Protocol I is further limited  due  to  the  fact
that it requires a very high threshold of damage. The  environmental  harm  has  to  meet  all  three
conditions of “severe”, “long-term”, and “widespread”.
The great advantage of Protocol I compared with the Hague  and  Geneva  Conventions  is  that  it
does not provide for the defence of military necessity. However, this concession comes  at  a  high
price   since   the   absence   of   this   defence   deterred   a   number    of    major    powers    from
ratification.[lxxvii]  Additional  Protocol  I  therefore  remains  a  weak  legal  instrument  with  its
provisions not becoming customary law.
Additional Protocol II elaborates on the  principles  of  Common  Article  3  that  governs  internal
armed conflicts. The diplomatic conference that  drafted  both  Additional  Protocols  at  the  same
time rejected a proposal to  include  environmental  provisions  in  Additional  Protocol  II,  which
would mirror the protection of Articles 35(3) and 55 of  the  Additional  Protocol  I.[lxxviii]  Thus
Additional Protocol II does not explicitly mention the environment. However, Articles 14  and  15
Additional Protocol II might offer implicit  protection  for  the  environment  under  the  following
circumstances. Article  14  of  Additional  Protocol  II  outlaws  starvation,  which  would  include
scorched earth practices or the use of poisonous gas if used targeting crops or livestock. Article 15
Additional Protocol II prohibits attacks on drinking  water  installations  and  irrigation  works.  In
addition, scorched earth  practices,  attacks  on  nuclear  power  plants  and  chemical  facilities  or
attacks on protected areas fall under the prohibition of article 17 of Additional Protocol  II  if  they
form part of forced movement  of  civilians.  However,  like  the  Hague  Conventions,  Additional
Protocol II does not offer implementation  provisions  and  lacks  the  grave  breach  provisions  of
Geneva Conventions and Protocol I.
Thus, Additional Protocol II  offers  less  environmental  protection  and  less  enforceability  than
Additional  Protocol  I.  This  means  that   in   non-international   armed   conflicts,   international
humanitarian  law  offers  a  very   limited   environmental   protection.   However,   national   and
international criminal courts and tribunals can choose to include violations of Additional  Protocol
II in their subject jurisdiction. For example, the Statute for the International Criminal Tribunal  for
Rwanda[lxxix] included provisions allowing for people to  be  held  criminally  liable  for  serious
violations of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II.[lxxx]
The Convention  on  the  Prohibition  of  Military  or  Any  Other  Hostile  Use  of  Environmental
Modification Techniques is the first international treaty  that  specifically  governs  environmental
impacts  of  armed  conflict  as  a  distinct  issue  and  is  thus  celebrated  as  a  milestone   in   the
development of  environmental  law  of  war.[lxxxi]This  Convention  deals  with  techniques  that
manipulate the climate, earthquakes, the ozone layer, tidal  waves  and  ocean  currents.  Article  2
ENMOD defines environmental modification techniques as “any technique for changing - through
the deliberate manipulation of natural processes - the dynamics,  composition  or  structure  of  the
earth, including its biota, lithosphere,  hydrosphere  and  atmosphere,  or  of  outer  space”.[lxxxii]
Unlike Common Article 3 and Additional  Protocol  II,  ENMOD  is  not  limited  to  international
conflicts and like Additional Protocol I, ENMOD does not allow the defence of military necessity.
Furthermore, it has a lower threshold than Additional Protocol I as  it  requires  the  harm  to  meet
only one of the  three  conditions  of  ‘widespread,  long-lasting,  and  severe’.[lxxxiii]  The  major
weakness of ENMOD is that its scope is very limited and conventional combat techniques are  not
included.[lxxxiv] Thus most of today’s environmental  damage  caused  in  armed  conflict  is  not
covered.
The importance of ENMOD and the relevant environment provisions of  Additional  Protocol  I  is
that environmental damage is prohibited on its own even if not direct  suffering  of  human  beings
can be shown.[lxxxv]  However,  none  of  these  international  treaties  offer  comprehensive  and
enforceable protection against gross environmental damage in the context of armed conflict.
Rules against specific weapons
Further  environmental  protection  during  armed  conflict  is  offered  by  the  international   legal
instruments that prohibit the use of certain weapons.  Landmines,  for  example,  not  only  have  a
shattering impact on human life, limbs and economic development but  also  on  the  environment,
especially the wildlife. Countries such as Angola and Mozambique have suffered  from  the  long-
term consequences of landmines long after the end of the conflicts.[lxxxvi] The  same  is  true  for
cluster bombs, whose highly explosive bullets remain a danger for wildlife for  a  very  long  time.
Likewise, depleted uranium munitions are highly harmful  for  the  environment  because  of  their
radioactive and toxic  dust  as  well  as  the  aerosol  residue.  Therefore,  instruments  such  as  the
Convention  on  the  Prohibition  of  the  Use,  Stockpiling,  Production   and   Transfer   of   Anti-
Personnel Mines and their Destruction,[lxxxvii] the Amended Protocol II on Anti-Personnel Land-
Mines to the 1980 United Nations Convention  on  Certain  Conventional  Weapons,[lxxxviii]  the
Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and  of
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare[lxxxix] indirectly protect the environment. 
Rules Protecting Cultural Property
Very often parts of the environment are so intrinsically interwoven with a society’s culture  that  it
can fall under the protection of cultural property. In this case  an  indirect  avenue  for  prosecution
for environmental  injury  during  armed  conflict  could  be  a  convention  or  international  treaty
protecting  cultural  property.  For  example   the   Convention   for   the   Protection   of   Cultural
Property in the Event of Armed Conflict[xc] protects “monuments of architecture,  art  or  history,
whether religious or secular; archaeological sites; groups of buildings which,  as  a  whole,  are  of
historical or artistic interest; works  of  art;  […]  objects  of  artistic,  historical  or  archaeological
interest; as well as scientific  collections  and  important  collections  of  books  or  archives  or  of
reproductions of the property defined above”[xci].  Thus  attacks  of  natural  areas,  enclosing  for
example religious  shrines,  are  banned.[xcii]  The  Convention  prohibits  targeting,  pillaging  or
otherwise damaging these protected sites unless “where  military  necessity  imperatively  requires
such a waiver.”[xciii] However, the Second Protocol  to  the  Cultural  Property  Convention[xciv]
provides clear standards for the defence of military  necessity[xcv]  and  mitigation  measures  that
belligerents would then need to undertake.[xcvi] This Protocol also extends its protection  to  non-
international armed conflicts.[xcvii] It has been argued that the convention and its protocols  could
be used as models for a treaty specifically tailored to the protection of the environment in  internal
armed conflicts, including provisions for criminal prosecutions.[xcviii]
Rome Statute
Compared to other conflicts,  the  environmental  damage  caused  during  the  armed  conflicts  in
Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda was not very grave.[xcix] Thus it does not come as a surprise that
the Statutes of neither the International Criminal Tribunal for  Former  Yugoslavia  (ICTY)[c]  nor
for  the  International  Criminal  Tribunal   for   Rwanda   (ICTR)[ci]   mention   the   environment
explicitly. As in the previously discussed international instruments,  the  environment  is  to  some
extent indirectly protected through the prohibition of wanton destruction[cii] and pillaging.[ciii]
The first international criminal court to have direct jurisdiction over environmental damage  is  the
International Criminal Court. Article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the  Rome  Statute  of  the  International  Court
(Rome Statute)[civ] forbids
[i]ntentionally launching  an  attack  in  the  knowledge  that  such  attack  will  cause  […]
widespread, long-term and severe  damage  to  the  natural  environment  which  would  be
clearly  excessive  in  relation  to  the  concrete   and   direct   overall   military   advantage
anticipated.
Similar to the Additional  Protocol  I,  the  damage  to  the  environment  needs  to  meet  the  high
threshold of all three criteria of widespread, long-term and severe damage. Furthermore, the Rome
Statute requires an intention and unlike ENMOD and  Additional  Protocol  I,  recklessness  is  not
sufficient. In addition,  it  allows  the  defence  that  the  damage  was  not  ‘clearly  excessive’  on
balance with the  military  advantage.  While  both  terms  ‘clearly’  and  ‘excessive’  are  open  to
interpretation, the criterion of military advantage is a subjective standard  as  it  only  needs  to  be
anticipated rather than objectively determined. Consequently, it would be very  easy  to  argue  for
the defendant who had launched  an  environmentally  devastating  attack  that  they  thought  they
would achieve a military advantage that was worth the damage and thus not  clearly  excessive.  A
further  limit  to  the  environmental  protection  of  this  provision   is   that   it   only   applied   to
international armed conflicts whereas  many  of  the  current  conflicts  are  of  a  non-international
nature. The proposal to define war crimes for environmental harm in the context of internal armed
conflicts was regrettably rejected.[cv]
Like Additional Protocol II, the Rome Statute provides for  a  number  of  war  crimes  which  can
apply indirectly to the causation of environmental damage. Thus attacks on  religious  institutions,
attacks on natural areas containing historical and cultural monuments  and  scorched  earth  tactics
are forbidden. The Nuremberg trials which saw two trials for scorched earth practice was however
the last time a prosecution focussed on environmental damage  in  the  context  of  armed  conflict.
The displacement of civilian population is prohibited by article 8(2)(e)(viii) of  the  Rome  Statute
“unless the security of the civilians involved or imperative military  reasons  so  demand”.  Article
8(2)(e)(xii) Rome Statute bans “[d]estroying or seizing the property of  an  adversary  unless  such
destruction  or  seizure  be  imperatively  demanded  by  the  necessities  of  the  conflict”.  Severe
damage of the environment can even constitute genocide under Article 6(c) Rome Statute when  it
causes “deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical
destruction in whole or  in  part,”  for  example  widespread  intentional  soil  salinisation.  This  is
especially true  for  areas  where  indigenous  people  live  who  depend  on  natural  resources  for
survival.[cvi] Environmental damage can also constitute a  crime  against  humanity  according  to
Article  7  Rome  Statute  if  a  widespread  or  systematic  attack  against  the  civilian  population
includes pollution of drinking water, destruction of food sources or other natural resources.
Other Avenues
Bruch argues that even those international environmental treaties that are designed  for  peacetime
can be used in cases of armed conflict.[cvii] For example, the Convention  on  International  Trade
in Endangered Species[cviii] could be applied when the sale of ivory  is  used  to  finance  military
operations, and the Basel Convention[cix] could encompass  the  movement  of  military  materiel.
However, it is  still  unclear  to  what  extent  peacetime  environmental  law  is  applicable  to  the
situation of armed conflict. Nevertheless, international  environmental  law  should  be  used  as  a
basis for interpretation of Common Article 3, Protocol II, ENMOD and other relevant instruments
in cases of natural damage.[cx]
Conclusions
From  the  analysis  of  international  legal  instruments  that  deal  with  environmental  protection
during armed conflict, a disappointing picture emerges. The  rules  of  armed  conflict  only  rarely
deal with the environment directly.[cxi] The inclusion  of  a  vague  defence  of  military  defence,
high mens rea and actus reus thresholds and the restriction to international  conflicts,  while  most
contemporary conflicts are internal, leave the impunity gap for the worst environmental  offenders
wide open. In addition none of these instruments  deal  with  corporate  responsibility.[cxii]  What
was declared for human rights[cxiii] is equally true for environmental crimes:
Though corporations are capable of interfering with  the  enjoyment  of  a  broad  range  of
human rights, international law has failed both to articulate the human rights obligations of
corporations and to provide mechanisms for regulating corporate  conduct  in  the  field  of
human rights.[cxiv]
Corporate Responsibility in International Law
When considering the responsibility of corporations for environmental crimes, two  characteristics
of international environmental law are relevant. First of all, most legal instruments in international
environmental law provide guidance rather than enforcement. It mainly focuses on  prevention  of,
rather  than  reaction  to,  environmental  damage.  Secondly,  it  is  based  on  the  notion   of   the
responsibility lying with the state,  rather  than  with  the  direct  actors  who  cause  the  harm.  As
indicated above, these features of international environmental law renders it largely ineffective. In
what  follows  next,  we  will  evaluate  the  international  law  instruments  that  directly   regulate
corporate conduct and are seen to remedy some  of  the  weaknesses  of  ‘traditional’  international
environmental law.
As early as 1976 the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)  adopted
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprise (Guidelines),[cxv] which consist of recommendations  for
enterprises  relating  to  human  rights,  employment,  environments  and  consumer  interest.   The
Guidelines were quite innovative because they provide for National Contact Points (NCP),  which
are national offices for the promotion and implementation of the Guidelines. If a  NCP  receives  a
grievance about a corporation that has allegedly breached the Guidelines, they can offer mediation
or conciliation between the complainant and the corporation in question.[cxvi] However, there are
no sanctions against multinational corporations for not adhering to  the  Guidelines.  In  respect  to
serious damage to the environment, mediation and conciliation do not seem to  reflect  sufficiently
the gravity of the harm done to nature and people. Moreover, the NCP are free to  decide  that  the
complaint requires no further action. Unsurprisingly, only 24 cases have  been  heard  since  1976,
two of which occurred after 1990.
The International Labour Organization (ILO)  has  attempted  to  regulate  corporate  conduct  too.
One of the major ILO instruments, which  affect  the  work  of  multinational  corporations,  is  the
Tripartite  Declaration  of  Principles  Concerning  Multinational  Enterprises  and   Social   Policy
(Tripartite   Declaration).[cxvii]   This   declaration   regulates    the    conduct    of    multinational
corporations and defines the terms of relations between corporations and host  countries.  Like  the
OECD  Guidelines,  the   Tripartite   Declaration   is   not   binding   and   does   not   provide   for
sanctions. Rather than policing multinational corporations, the main purpose is to  use  diplomacy,
dialogue and moral persuasion to encourage compliance by the member states.
Another significant  international  instrument  is  the  United  Nations  Global  Compact  Initiative
(Global Impact), which was developed in 1999 by the former  United  Nations  Secretary  General
Kofi   Annan.   This    document    promotes    a    number    of    shared    values    and    corporate
citizenship[cxviii]by formulating ten[cxix] basic human rights principles which should be adhered
to  by  business  corporations.[cxx]  Principles  7-9  declare   that   businesses   should   support   a
precautionary  approach  to  environmental  challenges,  undertake  initiatives  to  promote  greater
environmental responsibility and encourage  the  development  and  diffusion  of  environmentally
friendly technologies. It, however, relies on the co-operation of multinational  corporations  which
means it lacks independent monitoring and policing mechanisms. Moreover,  it  does  not  provide
for any form of sanction or compensation for the victims.
In 2003 the United Nations Sub-Commission for the Promotion and Protection  of  Human  Rights
formulated the Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations  and  Other  Business
Enterprises  with  Regard   to   Human   Rights.[cxxi]   The   Norms   confirm   that   multinational
corporations   are   not   only   subject   to   human   rights   but   also   have   human   duties    and
responsibilities.[cxxii] Para 4 of the preamble  emphasises  the  co-responsibility  of  governments
and multinational corporation:
Realizing that transnational corporations and other business  enterprises,  their  officers
and  persons  working  for  them  are  also  obligated  to  respect  generally  recognized
responsibilities and norms contained in United Nations treaties and  other  international
instruments such as  […]  the  Convention  on  Biological  Diversity;  the  International
Convention on Civil  Liability  for  Oil  Pollution  Damage;  the  Convention  on  Civil
Liability for Damage Resulting  from  Activities  Dangerous  to  the  Environment;  the
Declaration on the Right to Development; the Rio Declaration on the Environment and
Development;  the  Plan  of  Implementation  of  the  World  Summit   on   Sustainable
Development; the United Nations Millennium Declaration[…][cxxiii]
What  is  more,  the  Norms   directly   address   corporations’   responsibility   for   environmental
protection. Section 14 provides that
[t]ransnational  corporations  and  other  business   enterprises   shall   carry   out   their
activities in accordance with national  laws,  regulations,  administrative  practices  and
policies relating to the preservation of the environment of the countries  in  which  they
operate, as well as in  accordance  with  relevant  international  agreements,  principles,
objectives, responsibilities and standards with  regard  to  the  environment  as  well  as
human rights, public health and safety, bioethics and the  precautionary  principle,  and
shall generally conduct their activities in a manner  contributing  to  the  wider  goal  of
sustainable development.
As one can see, the Norms do not create  new  responsibilities  or  extend  existing  protection  but
rather compile human rights norms that already exist in other international instruments.  However,
compared with other international instruments the Norms signify an improvement, as sections  15-
19 provide for a structured implementation mechanism. Corporations are  required  to  incorporate
them in their contracts with all business partners and “adopt, disseminate and  implement  internal
rules of operation in compliance with the norms.”[cxxiv] Further, the Norms  promote  transparent
and independent monitoring systems through  existing  United  Nations,  national  or  international
instruments that already exist or need to be created.[cxxv] In addition, they address national  states
who  are  asked   to   ensure   implementation   of   them   through   their   national   administrative
framework.[cxxvi]  Moreover,   they   provide   for   reparations,   restitution,   compensation   and
rehabilitation for the victims of non-compliance.[cxxvii] In spite of all  these  positive  points,  the
Norms suffer a number of limitations. First of all they lack  specific  enforcement  procedures,  for
example guidelines regarding how damages should be calculated.[cxxviii] Furthermore,  they  rely
on  monitoring  mechanisms  without  either  specifying  what  agencies  they  are  referring  to  or
creating an obligation to establish such agencies. Likewise they fail  to  determine  which  national
or  international  tribunals  have  the  relevant  jurisdiction.[cxxix]  This  question   is   particularly
important when a corporation is operating under  more  than  one  jurisdiction.[cxxx]  Further,  the
Norms do not have the status of a  United  Nations  treaty.  The  major  drawback  is  that  like  the
OECD Guidelines, they rely  on  implementation  by  national  states.  This  is  of  no  help  to  the
victims in states who  are  reluctant  to  oppose  multinational  corporations.  In  sum,  there  is  no
international legal instrument to date  that  effectively  regulates  multinational  corporations.  The
question then  is  whether  domestic  law  offers  a  better  avenue  to  tackle  gross  environmental
damage caused by multinational corporations.[cxxxi]
Corporate Responsibility at the National Front
1 Environmental Law in the Host State
The most appropriate and arguably the most interested state is the state  in  which  the  corporation
operates and where the environmental damage has occurred, the so-called host  state.  It  is  in  the
state’s  interest  to  preserve  the  nature  and  the  livelihood   it   offers   for   present   and   future
generations. At the same time, the host state is also the state that is most unlikely to be  willing  or
able  to  attack  a  multinational  corporation  which  brings  employment,  revenue  and  economic
growth.[cxxxii] The result is that the most powerful  multinational  corporations  benefit  from  an
informal impunity even for the grave environmental damage[cxxxiii]. This  is  especially  true  for
developing countries, which  are  most  vulnerable  to  the  economic  pressure  that  a  corporation
might  put  on  the  government.  Few  African  courts  have   so   far   applied   the   constitutional
provisions[cxxxiv] relating to environmental  protection.[cxxxv]As  Professor  Ratner  points  out,
“[c]orporations  are  powerful  global  actors  that  some  states  lack   the   resources   or   will   to
control.”[cxxxvi] One of  the  consequences  of  this  race  to  the  bottom  is  the  minimisation  of
governance,  which  leads  to   a   lack   of   effective   legislation   and   enforcement   of   existing
norms.[cxxxvii] In addition, in some  states  effective  governance  and  accountability  are  absent
because they are ridden with violent conflict or civil war.[cxxxviii] For these reasons, in  the  eyes
of many multinational corporations the risk of criminal prosecution or  civil  law  actions  remains
insignificant compared to the benefits of low cost production.
At the same time, poor countries are most exposed in  respect  of  environmental  damage.  Firstly,
the economy of developing countries is often much more dependent on the agriculture sector  than
in   developed   countries,   which   makes    them    more    vulnerable    to    any    harm    to    the
environment.[cxxxix] For example, the food demand in Africa is predicted to grow by  25  percent
within the next ten years.[cxl] In addition, it is mostly in developing countries  that  one  finds  the
most ecologically sensitive environments, which again  makes  these  countries  more  exposed  to
environmental    damage.    Africa    is,    for    example,    the    continent    most    vulnerable    to
desertification.[cxli] Thirdly, these countries often do not have the technologies  and  resources  to
repair the damage once the catastrophe has been caused.
Both the  disincentives  to  regulate  corporations  as  well  as  the  vulnerability  to  environmental
damage are the sad reality for many  countries  in  Africa.[cxlii]  It  is  therefore  argued  here  that
Africa suffers  most  from  the  lack  of  enforcement  of  environmental  protection  laws  and  the
impunity of multinational corporations. Although national environmental legislation is growing in
Africa, there is very little restrictive environmental law which affects  corporations.[cxliii]  A  fine
is not understood as motivation to change corporate policies but rather as a  costly  inconvenience.
The immense expenditure of the legal settlement  Exxon  concluded  after  the  Exxon  Valdez  oil
spill disaster in Alaska in  1989,  for  example,  did  not  seem  to  worry  Lawrence  G.  Rawl,  the
chairman of Exxon too much. “We’re talking about stretching a bill out over  10  years,”  he  said.
“It will not curtail any of our plans.”[cxliv] This ‘cavalier corporate  attitude’[cxlv]  can  be  found
in many companies. There are, however, examples where small  countries  enforce  environmental
laws  against  powerful  companies.  For  example,   in   2002   Angola   fined   the   US   oil   firm
ChevronTexaco $2m for causing environmental damage,[cxlvi] however, these cases are  still  the
minority.  The  gas  flaring  in  Nigeria  for  instance,  which  is  causing  great  harm  to  both  the
environmental and human health, has continued now for decades  without  the  government  being
able to stop the practice.[cxlvii] Thus, in many cases the  host  states  are  unwilling  or  unable  to
enforce environmental law against multi-national corporations even in  the  most  severe  cases  of
environmental damage.
2 Civil Litigation in the Home State
If the host state remains passive, another possible avenue could be to expect the home state of  the
multi-national corporation to bring them to justice even though the violation has  been  committed
abroad.
It was the United States who first gave its courts civil  jurisdiction  for  alleged  violations  outside
the United States. The Alien Tort Claims  Act  (ACTA)  1789  allows  non-citizens  to  bring  civil
action for torts that have been committed abroad.[cxlviii] Within the last few decades this  act  has
been used a number of times to bring action regarding human rights violations that have  allegedly
been  committed  by  multinational  corporations.[cxlix]  However,  there  are  a  number  of  legal
obstacles, which make actions under ACTA difficult. One hurdle  is  the  very  high  jurisdictional
threshold of the forum non conveniens  principle.[cl]  This  principle  means  that  a  case  may  be
dismissed if the court deems that a foreign jurisdiction is  the  more  appropriate  forum.[cli]  Thus
the claimant  has  to  show  that  the  host  country  of  the  corporation  that  has  been  accused  of
environmental crimes is not in a better position to deliver justice. One of the rare examples  where
a domestic court rejected forum non conveniens was the  English  case  Lubbe  v  Cape  PLC.[clii]
Here the House of Lords held that although
South Africa was the more appropriate  forum,  the  strong  probability  that  the  claimants
would be unable to obtain both the legal representation and the expert evidence required to
substantiate their claims in South Africa would amount to a denial of justice.[cliii]
Secondly, under the ACTA the claimants would need to  show  that  the  corporation  has  violated
“the law of nations.”[cliv] So far no United States Court has  declared  environmental  degradation
as a violation of  the  “law  of  nations”.[clv]  The  third  problem  is  that  for  most  human  rights
violations the claimant  has  to  show  a  form  of  state  action.[clvi]  In  many  cases  this  is  very
difficult, if not impossible for civilian claimants to get access  to  the  relevant  evidence  to  prove
state participation.[clvii] It is equally  hard  for  individuals  to  get  access  to  evidence  against  a
multinational corporation.[clviii] Defendants need to submit evidence  which  pierces  the  veil  of
corporate management to prove corporate involvement as well as corporate responsibility. Thus, it
does not come as a surprise that actions under ACTA are rarely successful.[clix]  So  far,  no  case
against a multinational corporation has been decided on its merits.[clx]
The European tort system is based on  nationality  and  territoriality  and  thus  less  hospitable  for
challenging corporate behaviour  abroad.[clxi]  The  only  other  country  where  non-citizens  can
bring action against human rights violations that have  been  committed  abroad  is  Belgium.  The
Belgium  Act  Concerning  the  Punishment  of  Grave  Breaches  of   International   Humanitarian
Law[clxii] was  used  in  the  cases  of  alleged  forced  labour  in  Myanmar  and  involvement  of
mistreatment in Iraq.[clxiii]
Thus civil litigation in home countries is very rarely successful and as a result  an  ineffective  tool
in targeting multinational corporations. Stephens argues  that  “[m]ultinational  corporations  have
long outgrown the legal  structures  that  govern  them,  reaching  a  level  of  transnationality  and
economic power that exceeds domestic law’s ability to impose basic human rights  norms.”[clxiv]
Even the few cases that are brought to justice do “not capture public awareness and
apparently have not  yet  prompted  significant  improvements  in
environmental compliance.”[clxv]
3 Criminal Prosecution in the Home State
In most countries, cases of  serious  environmental  damage  are  prohibited  by  domestic  law.  In
addition a number of criminal offences such as homicide or non-fatal offences against  the  person
will  also  be   applicable.[clxvi]   Nevertheless,   for   a   number   of   reasons   national   criminal
prosecutions against multinational corporations in the home state are very rare.[clxvii]
To begin with, although many  criminal  justice  systems  around  the  world  have  now  extended
criminal responsibility to legal persons,[clxviii] traditionally criminal law is  based  on  the  notion
that the offender is a natural person. A corporation cannot act or think itself, but rather actions and
states of mind of employees need to be attributed to the corporation. In practice, it is very difficult
to distinguish between the actions of the natural persons who are acting for the  company  and  the
company itself. In addition, multinational corporations are structured with a multitude of decision-
making layers both in  the  home  and  host  countries.  This  makes  it  extremely  complicated  to
attribute  a  decision  of  a  daughter  company  in  the  host  country  to  the  parent   multinational
corporation in the home country. A related difficulty is to identify which country  has  jurisdiction
over the corporation.[clxix]
The second problem, and probably the  more  difficult  one  to  overcome,  is  the  question  of  the
independency of domestic criminal justice agencies. Although judges, prosecutors and  police  are
to a certain degree politically independent, they have to respect general policy guidelines  of  their
government when using  their  discretion.[clxx]  Powerful  multinational  corporations  are  in  the
position to exert considerable political and economic pressure on the home country and it is  often
not in the national interest to investigate against a  business  that  brings  in  revenue,  employment
and prestige to the country.[clxxi] Another  disincentive  of  prosecution  for  offences  committed
abroad is the political sensitivity of such cases. The involvement of the home state implies that the
host state is not capable of dealing with the case itself because of either  a  lack  of  governance  or
even involvement of the host country in the crimes. States are very  reluctant  to  encroach  on  the
sovereignty  of  another  state.[clxxii]  States  also  shun  from  imposing  their   home   regulatory
standards on the host countries.[clxxiii] In addition, these cases are not high priority  in  the  home
country’s public eye. In spite  of  growing  awareness  of  environmental  issues,  citizens  are  still
more perceptive of violent street crime than white collar crime. The public is more concerned with
their safety at home rather than with the environment and living conditions of people  in  a  distant
country. As the polluted river or the destroyed forest  lies  thousands  of  miles  away,  it  is  not  a
popular political choice to focus police attention on these apparently remote problems.
Thirdly, the investigation against the actions of a  multinational  corporation  abroad  is  incredibly
resource intensive. The amount of evidence required to assess the damage to  the  environment,  to
pierce  the  corporate  veil  and  to  link  certain  corporate  behaviour  to  the  harm,  is  enormous.
Furthermore, much of this evidence (especially witnesses) is only accessible in  the  host  country,
which means the investigation would, to a certain degree, need to be  conducted  abroad.  Such  an
extensive  investigation  would  require  both  substantial  resources  as  well  as  transnational  co-
operation. As Stephens observes: “Corporations  are  multinational  while  legal  systems  are  still
largely  national,  creating  a  disconnect   between   international   corporate   structures   and   the
law.”[clxxiv] In addition to that, the technical matter  of  environmental  crime  often  poses  many
evidential  problems.  Often  harm  to  people  and   environment   are   caused   through   complex
biological mechanism which make it difficult to link  a  certain  conduct  (e.g.  disposing  of  toxic
waste) to environmental injury.[clxxv] In addition, the crime might be discovered only months  or
years later, which makes proof of causation often impossible, especially if the chemical cannot  be
detected in the victims’ bodies any longer. [clxxvi]
In face of a limited budget for criminal investigation and the pressure to complete  a  high  number
of cases in a short amount of time, neither police nor prosecutors are inclined to allocate  much  of
the available resources to crimes that have been committed abroad unless the victims  are  citizens
of the state. Due to these  manifold  practical  and  legal  difficulties,  one  can  observe  a  lack  of
criminal prosecutions of multinational corporations in the home  countries.  In  the  United  States,
which is the home country of the majority of multinational corporations “less than one  percent  of
all defendants facing sentencing in federal courts  are  corporations”.[clxxvii]  It  will  have  to  be
seen whether the plans to start a criminal and civil litigation against BP,  which  President  Obama
announced on June 1 2010,[clxxviii] will lead to any trial.[clxxix] A promising development is the
trial against the London-based oil trader, Trafigura, for alleged waste dumping which started  June
2,  2010  in  the  Netherlands  and  the  conviction  of  8  corporate  officials  for  the   Bhopal   gas
disaster.[clxxx]
Corporate Responsibility and Self-Regulation
Since neither national nor international law seems able to effectively regulate  the  conduct  of  the
most powerful multinational business entities, a new form of regulation -corporate self-regulation-
has emerged to regulate multinational corporations to some degree. This form of soft law is  based
on the idea that the pressure of social awareness is often a  stronger  incentive  than  legislation  to
change their methods of operation. An example is the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme for
so-called blood diamonds  in  Sierra  Leone.  The  Kimberley  Process  Certification  Scheme  was
introduced  following  the  United  Nations  Security  Council’s  call  in  2000  to  take  “necessary
measures to prohibit the direct or indirect import of  all  rough  diamonds  from  Sierra  Leone”  to
their respective territories.[clxxxi] This scheme enables customers to  distinguish  legal  diamonds
from those diamonds that were used to fund the  violent  conflict.  Although  the  Scheme  is  only
voluntary soft law rather than enforceable national legislation, it was highly recommended  by  the
Security Council.[clxxxii]
The major instrument of self-regulation in dealing with corporate behaviour is the voluntary codes
of conduct.[clxxxiii] Codes of  conduct  can  be  defined  as  “commitments  voluntarily  made  by
companies, associations or other entities which put forth standards and principles for  the  conduct
of business activities in the marketplace”.[clxxxiv]  They  are  based  on  the  recognition  that  the
growing public awareness of social and environmental issues means that unsustainable production
can harm the brand image to an extent  that  makes  overly  cheap  production  unprofitable.  They
therefore aim to demonstrate a notion of corporate citizenship to the consumers. Indeed  corporate
social  responsibility  is  now  used   as   a   marketing   strategy   to   promote   a   positive   brand
image.[clxxxv] According to a study by the OECD, there are now hundreds of codes of conduct in
place.[clxxxvi] Although they reflect a welcome awareness of corporate responsibility, there are  a
number of reasons why codes of  conduct  do  not  represent  an  effective  tool  against  the  worst
environmental damages.
First of all,  these  codes  are  not  directly  enforceable  and  there  are  no  remedies  provided  for
breaches. Critics claim they are nothing more than lip  service[clxxxvii]  used  as  a  “mere  public
relations gimmick”.[clxxxviii] Another problem is posed by the sheer  number  of  different  codes
of conduct. Multinational corporations often operate in several different countries  and  work  with
many  different  business  partners.  Thus  they  have  to  adhere  to  various  different  codes  with
different standards.[clxxxix] Thirdly, there is not  a  uniform  mechanism  in  place  that  monitors
participating corporations. Questions such as whether there should  be  an  auditing  process,  how
independent the auditors would have to be, whether  the  outcomes  of  the  audit  are  to  be  made
public  and  how  the  audit   can   reconcile   different   standards   of   different   codes,   are   still
unresolved.[cxc] Over a third of the codes of conduct do not address the question of monitoring at
all.[cxci] In addition, the growing number of codes  could  lead  to  “code  fatigue”  and  minimise
their effectiveness.[cxcii] Even some business leaders themselves favour  a  uniform  international
agreement, in order to ensure an equal standard of obligations among all companies,[cxciii] which
would establish a level playing field among competing corporations.[cxciv] From the public  point
of view, the question  arises  whether  a  growing  number  of  voluntary  codes  of  conduct  could
encourage governments to avoid introducing binding legislation and instead  rely  increasingly  on
soft law. Therefore, rather than complementing national and international legislation,  there  is  the
danger that in the long run voluntary codes of conduct could replace them.[cxcv]
Seeing that fines are easily shrugged off by big companies as negligible extra costs of  production,
it  is   often   claimed   that   “community   pressure   is   the   only   real   sanction   for   enforcing
compliance”[cxcvi]. Nevertheless  the  fact  remains  that  self-regulation  is  not  enforceable  and
adherence is dependent on  the  cost-benefit  analysis  of  the  corporations.  Bearing  in  mind  the
danger of long-term effects of environmental harm for  cases  of  the  most  serious  environmental
damage,  self-regulation  is  far  from  being  an  appropriate  tool  to  fight   gross   environmental
offences.
Corporate Responsibility in International Criminal Law
As is evident from the above discussion, national and international environmental law  as  well  as
self-regulation prove to be incapable of tackling the most  serious  environmental  damage  caused
by corporations. At the same time it is extremely urgent that  effective  responses  are  found.  The
Stockholm  Declaration  made  clear  that  the  environment  is  a   global   concern   that   requires
international collaboration.
A growing class of environmental problems, because they are regional or global  in  extent
or because they affect the common international realm, will require  extensive  cooperation
among nations and action by international l organizations in the common interest.[cxcvii]
As  early  as  1990  the  United  Nations  General  assembly   noted   that   the   protection   of   the
environment is inseparable from the full enjoyment of human rights  by  all.[cxcviii]  It  is  argued
here that in the most severe cases of environmental damage, international criminal law  should  be
used as ultimo ratio to sanction gross  environmental  damage  and  to  end  de  facto  impunity  of
multinational corporations. Thus the mainly preventive nature of international  environmental  law
should be complemented by the essentially punitive international criminal law.
Jessup declares that “it is imperative that those who flout the right to a healthy  environment  incur
criminal liability for their actions.”[cxcix] It is interesting to observe that international  law  grants
corporations certain human rights, but it generally does not recognize  corporations  as  bearers  of
legal obligations under international criminal law.[cc] One reason for this is that it is  questionable
whether it is appropriate to make a corporation criminally responsible. After all, a corporation is  a
legal fiction rather than a moral being.  Criminal  law  condemns  blameworthy  human  behaviour
and therefore, it  is  argued,  the  control  of  corporations  should  be  left  to  regulatory  offences.
However, there are already a  number  of  international  legal  instruments  which  create  criminal
liability  for  legal  entities,  such  as  the  Basel  Convention   on   Hazardous   Wastes.[cci]   It   is
recognised that nowadays multinational corporations play an increasing part of social life and thus
must recognise social responsibility.[ccii] The major advantage of criminal law is that unlike  civil
law, soft law and most international instruments, it provides for  conviction  and  punishment.  An
international  criminal  conviction  of  a  multinational  corporation  would  present  the   strongest
condemnation of the international community.[cciii] Rather than leaving it  to  the  corporation  to
assess whether a code of conduct would benefit their business, a criminal conviction  would  force
every major multinational business to rethink their modes of operation and their relationships with
subsidiary companies. Civil Law can also award punitive damages. However, civil  law  sanctions
cannot  address  the   culture   of   profiting   from   unsustainable   production   methods,   conflict
commodities and war economy and corporations are more likely to  factor  them  in  as  additional
costs.  As  Bellow  and  Sturtz  explain:  “The  purpose  of  criminal   enforcement   is   to   shatter
corporations’ belief that civil fines are merely a licence to pollute or a  business  cost  that  can  be
passed on to consumers.”[cciv] Moreover, multinational corporations are increasingly sensitive  to
consumer opinions.  The  shattering  effect  of  the  condemnation  of  an  international  conviction
would be more effective than any civil law remedy. It is this deterrent effect  and  its  preventative
potential that justifies the extension of criminal responsibility to corporations.  Criminal  law  does
not only condemn certain behaviour but also educates about the values of a society.  An  increased
criminalisation of environmental offences at international level conveys the  message  that  serious
environmental damage cannot be tolerated any longer.
Thus extending the jurisdiction of the International  Criminal  Court  to  environmental  crime  not
only deters or punishes individual offenders but  also  publicises  the  gravity  of  the  problem.  In
addition, an international criminal  prosecution  against  a  corporation  shifts  responsibility  from
states for failure to regulate adequately to prevent environmental harm to those actors who  caused
the environmental damage.[ccv]
1 The International Criminal Court
Bruch criticises that “there remains a distinct lack of practice and international fora charged with a
clear mandate to prosecute environmental crimes.”[ccvi] Arguing that  international  criminal  law
should complement other national and international legal mechanisms, it is put  forward  here  that
the appropriate forum for such prosecutions would be  the  permanent  international  criminal  law
Court  at  The  Hague.  The  establishment  of  a  separate  court  for  international   environmental
crimes[ccvii] would cause the unnecessary problems setting up a new court,[ccviii]  which  would
include delays and additional costs. Moreover,  very  often  environmental  crimes  are  committed
during wartime in the context of other war crimes  and  crimes  against  humanity.  It  would  be  a
waste of resources to separate such cases and deal with them in separate courts. The  extension  of
International Criminal Court  crimes  would  also  send  out  a  strong  message  to  national  states
pressing them to  adopt  their  own  domestic  legislation.  The  International  Criminal  Court  has
already been proven  to  be  very  influential  in  encouraging  a  number  of  States  to  bring  their
national criminal justice systems in accordance with the Rome State  and  engage  in  international
criminal prosecutions.
2  Grave Crimes against the Environment
The rapid development of international criminal law since the 1990s  reflects  the  growing  notion
that gross human rights violations harm the whole of humanity and  that  impunity  of  the  gravest
perpetrators cannot be tolerated any longer. However, considering the harm serious environmental
crimes cause for present and future generations,  it  is  imperative  that  international  criminal  law
should encompass these offences as well. On  the  other  hand,  any  extension  of  the  substantive
jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court bears the risk of trivialisation of  the  core  crimes.
However, considering the long lasting damage that these crimes cause to the environment and  the
direct and indirect harm caused to present and future generations, it is argued that these crimes are
on the same level as crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide. One  could  argue  that  at
least  those  environmental  crimes  that  are  committed  during  armed  conflict  can   usually   be
prosecuted under the existing crime listed in Article 5 of the Rome Statute,  i.e.  genocide,  crimes
against humanity or war crimes. However, there are three problems with this approach. Firstly, for
reasons of fair labelling it is important that  the  crimes  against  nature  are  clearly  prosecuted  as
such and that  the  environmental  harm  is  not  just  seen  as  an  appendix  to  the  harm  of  other
protected subjects. Secondly, as was seen above, most of the  relevant  war  crimes  that  could  be
used for environmental damage are only applicable in international rather  than  internal  conflicts.
Thirdly,  Bruch  warns  that  “even  if  the  International  Criminal  Court  is   inclined   to   pursue
environmental damage from  an  internal  armed  conflict,  the  specific  standards  and  norms  are
unclear, and the danger exists that a person might  be  charged  for  something  he  or  she  did  not
know was a crime.”[ccix] This  is  why  in  order  to  respect  the  principle  of  nullum  crime  sine
legem[ccx] the new offence of grave crimes against the environment should be  added  rather  than
prosecuting environmental crime as war crime against humanity or genocide.
The call for a new international crime  to  reflect  the  seriousness  and  urgency  of  contemporary
harm and destruction of the environment is not new. In the Draft Articles on  State  Responsibility
the International Law Commission declared “that the breach of rules concerning  the  environment
may constitute… in some cases, an international crime”.[ccxi] A  number  of  commentators  have
proposed the establishment of an ‘ecocide’ or ‘geocide’ treaty that would provide a parallel to  the
crime of genocide.[ccxii]
The gravity of the situation demands  that  there  be  a  mechanism  for  bringing  the  most
serious environmental offenders to heel. That mechanism must, of necessity, be  the  crime
of geocide. It is through enforcement of such a crime  that  states  and  individuals  will  be
able to ensure greater respect for the right to a healthy environment.[ccxiii]
Although  Berat’s  argument  draws  attention  to  the  urgency   of   contemporary   environmental
problems, this suggestion is untenable in legal terms. Obviously the offender  will  not  have  been
able to complete the actus reus of destroying the environment to such an extent that it is incapable
of  sustaining  life.  Thus,  such  an  offence  would  need  to   be   structured   like   genocide,   i.e.
proscribing certain acts  that  the  offender  committed  with  the  intention  to  destroy  the  planet.
Realistically,  it  would  be  difficult  to  find  cases  where  an  offender  had  such   an   intention.
Moreover, most of the current cases of environmental damage are not in  themselves  sufficient  to
destroy the whole globe. Rather it is the computation of different acts of destruction and  pollution
around the world that endangers this planet. Thus the term geocide helps to draw  attention  to  the
gravity and urgency of the problem but not as a legal mechanism.
Instead it is proposed here that the Rome Statute should include the new offence  of  grave  crimes
against  the  environment.  McLaughlin  proposes   the   following   core   of   a   definition   while
acknowledging that the details would need to be elaborated on: [ccxiv]
For the purpose of this Statute, “environmental crimes” means the intentional or reckless
commission by an individual or individuals, regardless of the status of the act  under  any
applicable domestic regulation, of any of the following acts:
(a) directly causing large scale or serious pollution of the:
1. sea;
2. atmosphere;
3. [other relevant sites/mediums of pollution]; or
(b) conducting an activity, the widespread harmful  effects  of  which  should  have  been
contemplated by a reasonably prudent individual; or
(c) breaching an obligation within the  established  framework  of  international  law,  the
observance of which is recognized as essential for the protection of the  environment;
or
(d) aiding or abetting any of the above acts.
There are some deficiencies with this definition.  First  of  all,  there  seems  to  be  a  considerable
overlap between (a) and (b). Furthermore, (c) does not seem to be workable as not all  states  have
ratified all international environmental treaties, which would mean different individuals would  be
measured according to different standards. Besides, if this offence would be included in the  Rome
Statute (d) would be covered by  the  modes  of  participation  in  Article  25(3)(c)  Rome  Statute.
Finally, the restriction of the mens  rea  to  intention  only  seems  to  set  the  threshold  too  high.
Although  McLaughlin’s  definition  has  many  positive  aspects  here,  a   different   approach   is
suggested.
Structure
It is argued here that, leaning on the model  of  Articles  6-8  Rome  Statute,  the  new  offence
should list specific prohibited results whose causation leads to criminal responsibility.  Instead
of a referral to other instruments it is suggested that obligations on  which  the  member  states
can agree should be listed in the definition of the  offence.[ccxv]  However  this  list  could  be
rooted in international environmental law norms, for  example  international  treaties  covering
maritime pollution, fresh water pollution, desertification, deforestation, destruction of  wildlife
and others.
Threshold
It is important to stress that the International Criminal Court should only prosecute the  offence  of
grave crimes against the environment if it is of the same  seriousness  as  the  other  crimes  in  the
Rome  Statute.  Hence  this  new  offence  would  include  a  high  threshold  to  limit  the  Court’s
jurisdiction to the most severe cases. Relevant criteria could include harm caused to human beings
(direct  harm  such  as  severe  bodily  harm  or  death  or  non-immediate  harm  such   as   slowly
developing illnesses,  stillbirths  or  loss  of  fertility),  the  scale  of  damage  to  environment  and
longevity of the environmental harm. One question is whether the  member  parties  of  the  Rome
Statute would be willing to extend the Court’s jurisdiction. As was seen above, there are only very
few binding international environmental legal instruments. In general, international environmental
law is based on negotiated soft law far from any obligations  of  customary  law.  However  if  this
offence was to be restricted to a very high threshold of clearly  foreseeable  and  unjustifiable  risk
and a high threshold of harm, it  can  be  expected  that  the  vast  majority  of  member  states  and
maybe even non-member states would sign up to the new offence.
Actus Reus
Unlike section (b) in Laughlin’s model, the definition of  the  offence  should  only  include  result
crimes rather than conduct crimes. However the term ‘may be expected  to  cause’  makes  it  clear
that danger of harm is a sufficient result and the actual damage, which might manifest  itself  years
after the commission, does not need to be proven  by  the  prosecution,  as  long  as  the  danger  is
patent. Thus the use of landmines in a wild  forest  would  be  sufficient  for  criminal  prosecution
even before direct harm of wildlife can be shown.
An aspect that is of crucial importance is the question  of  causation.  In  many  cases  it  might  be
difficult to prove beyond reasonable doubt that a certain action by a corporation is  the  sole  cause
of the environmental damage. Therefore it is  suggested  to  include  the  threshold  of  ‘substantial
causation’. It will then be for the Prosecution to rebut any claim of the defendant that other factors
contributed significantly to the environmental harm.
Mens Rea
As a general rule the required mental element in the Rome statute is  intent  or  knowledge,[ccxvi]
but the concept of  command  responsibility  includes  recklessness.[ccxvii]  While  environmental
damage in the context of armed conflict is very often part of the intended attack, in  peacetime  the
damage is not wanted in itself but accepted as a side-effect of cost-effective  production  methods.
In order to include the most serious crimes in both wartime and peacetime, it is suggested that  the
mens rea threshold should  be  lowered  to  include  objective  recklessness.  Borrowing  from  the
Additional Protocol I, the offence would prohibit acts “which are intended, or may be expected, to
cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment.”[ccxviii] That  means
the offender is criminally responsible if they commit the actus  reus  while  the  prohibited  results
were clearly foreseeable for a reasonable person.
Corporate Criminal Responsibility
In order to use the International Criminal Court  for  corporate  environmental  crimes,  Article  25
Rome Statute, which provides for jurisdiction over natural persons, would need to be  extended  to
include criminal responsibility of legal persons, such as multinational  corporations.  Already  one
can observe a growing awareness of the supporting crimes  which  make  human  rights  violations
possible.  Rather  than  only  the  combatants  and   the   masterminds   behind   the   offences   the
International Criminal Court  starts  looking  at  financial  causes.  For  example,  Prosecutor  Luis
Moreno Ocampo has indicated that he might investigate persons involved in the trade of  so-called
blood diamonds.[ccxix] At the same time the  link  between  war  crimes  and  corporations  which
profit in war economies has long been recognised; there have  been  calls  for  corporate  sanctions
from World War II[ccxx] to Vietnam.[ccxxi] Fisse and Braithwaite have shown  that  corporations
are not simply the sum of their employees. They develop an ethos beyond that  of  the  individuals
who act for them.[ccxxii] In addition, if only individuals were  to  be  convicted  and  punished,  it
would be too easy for corporations to use them as scapegoats[ccxxiii] or single them out as “a few
bad apples”.  In view of the gross human rights violations[ccxxiv] and environmental damage that
corporations cause, which are to concern of the whole international community, the Rome  Statute
need to be amended and personal jurisdiction extended to legal persons.
However, there is strong resistance against the  extension  of  the  Court’s  jurisdiction  over  legal
persons. A corporation does not have any physical existence. It is not an agency that is acting  and
thinking but merely  a  legal  fiction.  Many  argue  that  criminal  law  is  punishing  blameworthy
conduct and that assuming moral behaviour for a corporation  is  taking  this  fiction  too  far.  The
primary purpose of corporations is to maximise profit rather  than  engaging  in  social  welfare  or
environmental protection.[ccxxv] As Stephens explains:
Profit-maximization, if not the only goal of all business activity, is certainly central  to  the
endeavour. And the pursuit of  profit  is,  by  definition,  an  amoral  goal—not  necessarily
immoral, but rather morally neutral. An  individual  or  business  will  achieve  the  highest
level of profit by weighing all decisions according to a self-serving economic scale.  Large
corporations magnify the consequences of the amoral profit motive.[ccxxvi]
Beyond the question of moral blameworthiness of corporations there is however  another  pressing
reason to include legal persons in the reach of international criminal law. It is  the  urgency  of  the
need to deter future reckless behaviour that potentially damage the planet and  mankind  for  many
generations  that  requires  putting  an   end   to   the   de   facto   immunity,   which   multinational
corporations enjoy for the most serious environmental damage. More  discussion  and  negotiation
between  Member  States  would  be  needed   to   agree   on   a   concept   of   corporate   criminal
responsibility to establish principles  under  which  the  actions  and  mental  states  of  individuals
could be attributed  to  a  company  (e.g.  identification  theory  or  vicarious  liability).  It  is  here
suggested that a corporation is  responsible  for  conduct  which  was  part  of  explicit  or  implicit
company policy, or committed with knowledge of senior management.
Penalties
Article 77 of the Rome Statute which provides for fines only in  addition  to  imprisonment  would
need to be amended to include  fines-only  penalties  for  corporations.  Circumstances  which  the
Court should need to take into consideration when finding the appropriate sentence would  include
the extent of the damage, the nature of the  affected  nature  (e.g.  importance  to  human  survival,
rarity etc), the  degree  of  recklessness  of  the  corporation,  the  extent  of  attempts  to  clear  the
damage,  previous  behaviour,  size  and  wealth  of  the  corporation  and  profit  realised   by   the
offence.[ccxxvii]
An element which would be  new  in  international  criminal  law  would  be  to  allow  for  special
mitigating  circumstances  for  this  crime.  In  the  United  States,  the  Environmental   Protection
Agency indicates that activities such as  self-policing,  self-auditing  and  voluntary  disclosure  of
environmental  violations  will  be  viewed  as  mitigating  factors  in   the   exercise   of   criminal
environmental  enforcement  discretion.[ccxxviii]  This  model  could  be   used   in   international
criminal environmental law. A corporation that  can  show  it  has  implemented  policies  of  self-
auditing and disclosure will be able  to  demonstrate  that  it  does  not  fall  below  the  reasonable
standard required. An example of this would be if it  had  no  knowledge  of  certain  risks  and  no
foresight. It could also be used as  mitigating  circumstances  when  assessing  the  penalty  after  a
conviction. If case law developed where corporate policies played a role  in  evaluating  both  guilt
and blameworthiness, this would be a great incentive for all corporations to increase  transparency
and introduce policies of more care.
Special Chamber
The adoption of a new offence of grave crimes against the environment would  change  the  nature
of the  International  Criminal  Court.  Although  genocide  and  crimes  against  humanity  can  be
committed in peacetime, the situations the International Criminal Court will deal  with  will  be  of
extreme violence.[ccxxix] Environmental crimes could be committed without the context of  mass
violence. At the same time the evaluation of the facts might require a  greater  specific  knowledge
of environmental law. It is thus proposed to establish a new Chamber dedicated  to  environmental
crimes.
Conclusions
A point has been reached in history when we must shape our actions throughout the  world
with a more prudent care for the environmental consequences […] To defend and  improve
the human environment for present and future generations has become an  imperative  goal
for mankind--a goal to be pursued together with, and in harmony with, the established  and
fundamental goals of peace and of worldwide economic and social development.[ccxxx]
One should not overlook the great benefits multinational corporations generally bring to their host
and home countries. However, the great economic power that corporations  have  is  not  separable
from great responsibility. In those cases  where  multinational  corporations  abuse  this  power  to
engage in conduct which causes grave damage  to  the  environment,  and  national  states  are  not
willing or able to prosecute, the international community  needs  to  end  this  de  facto  immunity.
“Although critics have characterized the present  degrading  of  the  environment  as  a  sin  which
generations will  not  forgive”[ccxxxi]  we  have  not  yet  managed  to  find  an  effective  way  to
reconcile our wish for economic growth  with  sustainable  production  methods.  Neither  national
law of the host and home countries of corporations nor  international  law  nor  self-regulation  has
proven to be  effective  in  fighting  the  worst  preventable  environmental  damage.  International
criminal law is not the panacea for environmental protection but it could play a vital role, and it  is
time that all possible avenues are explored. The adoption of a new international  crime  prosecuted
before the International Criminal Court is one of these possible routes. 
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